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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a
Motion for Summary Judgment for the defendant from the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on April 22,
1992.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)

(J).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS
The following rules are essential to the determination of
this appeal:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) states in pertinent
part:
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . .
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 407 states that:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event. This rule does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

The defendant is in agreement with the plaintiff's
statements concerning the nature of the case with one exception.
The plaintiff alleges that she "sustained permanent and disabling
injuries due to smoke inhalation from the fire, medical expenses
that exceeded $50,000, and was left with a significant degree of
permanent disability from the fire."

Appellant's Brief page 4.

The defendant is not in agreement with the plaintiff's statements
concerning her permanent disability resulting from the fire and
the medical expenses allegedly exceeding $50,000.

Therefore, the

defendant disputes such statements made by the plaintiff
concerning the nature of the case.

Further, the Court should

note that the defendant is a non-profit corporation originally
created by several school districts.

The defendant was created,

and Wasatch Manor built, as an apartment building to be used by
retired teachers.

Subsequently, the defendant accepted tenants

who were not retired teachers.

However, the defendant remains a

non-profit corporation, providing housing for retired, semiretired and elderly people who can care for themselves and are
ambulatory.

B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition

The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's statements
concerning the course of the proceedings and the disposition at
2

the trial court level with one exception.

The plaintiff alleges

that "due to difficulty in obtaining expert testimony as to the
degree to which sprinklers would have been effective in limiting
the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor, Schreiter moved to
continue trial of the case approximately one month before the
trial date and before the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was filed."

Appellant's Brief page 5.

The defendant disputes

this statement.
The plaintiff had known since prior to the time her
complaint was filed in November 1990, that she needed a fire
sprinkler system expert witness.

Rec. at 13 0.

The expert

witness designation cutoff date was set, at plaintiff's request
to expedite the case due to plaintiff's age, for August 31, 1991.
Plaintiff's counsel did not designate any fire sprinkler system
expert in his list of expert witnesses served on August 30, 1991.
Rec. at 60-61.

Nor did plaintiff's counsel move to supplement

plaintiff's designation of expert witnesses after receiving
defense counsel's list of expert witnesses on August 30, 1991,
which included a fire sprinkler system expert.

Rec. at 58.

Plaintiff's counsel did not move to supplement plaintiff's expert
witness list to add a fire sprinkler system expert until six
months later and immediately prior to the final scheduling
conference.

The Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the

expert witness designation list, prepare a fire sprinkler system
expert and have him deposed prior to April 17, 19 92.

3

Rec. at

128.

Trial was set to commence on May 11, 1992.

Plaintiff's

counsel did not do so.
Ironically, the plaintiff is now stating that it was due to
her difficulty in obtaining expert testimony that she was unable
to designate a fire sprinkler system expert.

The plaintiff had

more than adequate time to obtain expert testimony concerning the
degree to which sprinklers would have been effective in limiting
the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor.

The plaintiff

designated, timely, expert witnesses in the area of building
codes, fire investigation and health care.

Rec. at 58.

The

plaintiff had a number of resources to obtain a fire sprinkler
system expert.

The affidavit of the defendant's fire sprinkler

system expert witness, William Pickett, states that there are
twenty businesses or individuals qualified in Salt Lake County,
alone, to provide cost estimates for sprinkler systems.
363, [Affidavit of William Pickett, 12:12-14].

Rec. at

Plaintiff could

have retained anyone of them at anytime before filing suit,
before designating expert witnesses, before the discovery cut-off
date, or when granted additional time to designate a fire
sprinkler system expert.

Therefore, the defendant disputes the

plaintiff's statement concerning the difficulty of obtaining a
fire sprinkler system expert.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is undisputed that the defendant's building met or
exceeded the building code at the time of construction.
4

It is

further undisputed that the defendant's building passed all
inspections made by the fire department between the time of
completion and the time of the fire.

With these facts, the

burden was on the plaintiff to establish that a reasonable and
prudent building owner, who has complied with applicable building
and fire codes, still would install a fire sprinkling system.
This requires the plaintiff to produce evidence of; (1) the cost
of installing a fire sprinkler system in defendant's building;
and (2) the ability of the defendant to pay such costs.
Inability to prove these two elements prevents the plaintiff from
establishing a prima facie case.

Therefore, the Court's order

granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, for no cause
of action, was proper and should be affirmed by this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The standard which applies to motions for summary judgment
are stated in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule

56 basically states that "a motion for summary judgment should be
granted only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."
1982).

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah

Where no material fact remains at issue, the Utah Court
5

of Appeals reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness.

Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446

(Utah App. 1989) .
If the undisputed material facts show that the plaintiff
cannot prove a prima facie case at the time the defendant files
it's motion for summary judgment, then the motion for summaryjudgment must be granted.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91

L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).

In

Celotex, the Court stated that:
[t]here can be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. The
standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a) . . .
Id. at 477 U.S. 323.
In the case at bar, plaintiff has not fulfilled her burden
of proving a prima facie case of negligence against the
defendant.

In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985),

the Court set out the standard for proving a prima facie case of
negligence.

The plaintiff must show:

(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the causation,
both actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the
suffering of damages by the plaintiff.

6

In our case, the plaintiff has not shown the second
of the standard.

element

The plaintiff has not shown a breach of a duty

owed by the defendant.
The plaintiff has cited cases that stand for the proposition
that "summary judgment is reserved for only the most clear cut
negligence cases."

Although it is true that most negligence

actions are questions of fact resolved by the fact finder, "it
would be a mistake to conclude summary judgment is never
appropriate in a negligence action."

Adams v. Union Carbide

Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing to Crolev v. Matson
Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970).

Crolev, and other

decisions provide ample authority for the use of summary judgment
in negligence cases.

See, e.g., Gracyalny v. Westinghouse

Electric Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1983) ("a grant of
summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground that finds support
in the record"); Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337
(9th Cir. 1981); Aetna v. Loveland Gas & Electric, 369 F.2d 648
(6th Cir. 1966); Millhouse v. General Tire & Rubber, 459 N.E.2d
623 (Ohio App. 1983).
In Davis v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.
1976), a motion for summary judgment was held properly granted to
a defendant insurer in an action by any employee, injured while
operating a machine on the job, for negligent inspection, when
the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate the necessary elements of
such a cause of action.

Like Davis, the plaintiff in our case

has not been able to prove a prima facie case of negligence
7

against the defendant and therefore, this Court should affirm the
trial court's order granting a motion for summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, as a matter of law.

POINT II.
WITHOUT A FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM EXPERT PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE
A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
It is undisputed that the defendant did not violate any fire
or building codes at the time the building was built, or at the
time of the fire, by failing to have a fire sprinkler system in
place in the building.

Rec. at 161.

Previously, the fact that

the defendant's building met the fire and building codes wou 1 d
have provided a basis for granting a motion for summary judgment.
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Williams v. Melby, supra, held
that a plaintiff may attempt to show that a reasonable and
prudent person would have done more than the building code
required.
In the case at bar, in order for the plaintiff to show that
it was reasonable and prudent for the defendant to have installed
a fire sprinkler system in it's building prior to the fire, the
plaintiff must show, at a minimum:

1.) the cost of designing,

constructing and installing the fire sprinkler system; 2.) the
ability of the defendant to pay for this expense; and 3.) that a
reasonable and prudent building owner would have incurred the
expense.

Without a fire sprinkler system expert witness, the

plaintiff cannot show these elements of proof essential to her
prima facie case.

Like a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case
8

where expert witness testimony is critical, so to is a fire
sprinkler system expert critical to the plaintiff's case at bar.
Failure to produce expert witness testimony in a medical
malpractice case, prior to trial, provides the Court with a
sufficient basis for granting a motion for summary judgment.
See, Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1980); Nixdorf
v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980); and Marsh v. Pemberton,
10 P.2d 40, 44-45 (Utah 1959).

Plaintiff's failure to produce

expert testimony on the fire sprinkler system bars here, as well.

POINT III,
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT SUBMITTED ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THE COST OR DEFENDANT IS ABILITY TO PAY FOR THE COST
OF INSTALLING A FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM IN DEFENDANTS BUILDING,
The only evidence plaintiff had with respect to the cost of
installing a fire sprinkler system in the defendant's building
was the testimony of Burton Miller, the manager of Wasatch Manor.
Rec. at 484.

During a discovery deposition, Mr. Miller testified

that after the fire, defendant obtained a general estimate in the
amount of $185,000 to $200,000 as the cost of installing a fire
sprinkler system in the defendant's building.

The plaintiff had

no other evidence of the cost of installing a fire sprinkler
system.

The defendant objected to the use of such testimony

pursuant to Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence, as inadmissible,
and it was excluded as a subsequent remedial measure by the trial
court.

Rule 407 states that:

9

When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event. This rule does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment. (Emphasis added).
The plaintiff alleges that the Court erred in excluding such
evidence as subsequent remedial measures for two reasons.

First,

the plaintiff alleges that obtaining the estimate for the
installation of the fire sprinkler system was not a "subsequent
remedial measure" as contemplated under Rule 407.

Plaintiff

claims that, by itself, the estimate is not a measure taken after
the fire which, if obtained before February 7, 1990, would have
made the fire less likely.

Second, the plaintiff alleges that it

was clearly error for the Court to rule that the "feasibility
exemption [under Rule 407] applies only if there is an issue as
to whether or not the fire sprinkler system physically can be
installed."

The plaintiff argues that the clear language of Rule

407 does not limit the scope of the feasibility exemption in any
such manner, citing Reese

v. Mercury Marine Division of Brunswick

Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'q denied, 797
F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1986) .
Looking at the plain language of Rule 407, it is clear that
Mr. Miller's testimony concerning the general estimate of
installing a fire sprinkler system, after the fire, was

a

measure taken after an event which, if taken previously, might
have made the event less likely to occur.
10

Both parties

stipulated, for the purpose of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, that if a fire sprinkler system had been installed in
the defendant's building, that the fire would have extinguished
before reaching the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's main argument lies with the feasibility
exemption under Rule 407.

Rule 407 does not require the

exclusion of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose
such as the feasibility of precautionary measures, i_f
controverted.

However, the exception permitting the

admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to
prove the feasibility of such precautionary measures is permitted
only if feasibility is controverted by the opposing party.
Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (1980), cert,
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) .

The Advisory Committee notes to

the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 407, states that "unless a
genuine issue of feasibility is present, the exception should not
apply."

Id. at 855.

In other words, feasibility is not in issue

unless controverted by the opposing party.

Id.

In the case at bar, the defendant conceded that a fire
sprinkler system would have been an effective precautionary
measure which, physically, could have been installed, and agreed
to limit the scope of the motion for summary judgment solely to
the question of whether the plaintiff had presented a prima facie
case.

Therefore, the feasibility of installing a fire sprinkler

system in the defendant's building was not controverted and thus
did not raise an issue of feasibility as required by Rule 407.
11

Plaintiff cites Reese v. Mercury Marine Division of
Brunswick Corp., supra, for the proposition that the meaning of
11

feasibility" is not limited in the manner described by the

defendant.

Reese involved a wrongful death action brought

against a manufacturer of outboard motors.

In Reese the Court

found that the appellant's suggestion during trial that only the
retailer could properly instruct the ultimate consumer regarding
the use of a kill switch on an outboard motor clearly
controverted the utility and likelihood of success of the direct
manufacturer warnings in its owner's manual.

Thus, the Court

concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling the appellant's Rule 407 objection.

Id.

The decision

in Reese, in fact, supports the defendant's exact proposition
that the feasibility of precautionary measures must be
controverted to be admissible.
The testimony of Mr. Miller does not fall within the
feasibility exemption to Rule 407.

Rule 407 evidences a strong

public policy in favor of encouraging tortfeasors to review the
circumstances surrounding an accident to determine whether or not
something could be done to prevent further accidents from
happening.

Werner at 855.

This public policy requires the

exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures undertaken
by the tortfeasor, unless the activity falls within one of the
listed exemptions.

In our case, the efforts of the defendant in

obtaining an estimate on the installation of a fire sprinkler
system is subsequent remedial conduct that does not fall within
12

any of the exceptions listed in Rule 407.

Therefore, it is

clear that the trial court did not err in excluding such
testimony as a subsequent remedial measure pursuant to Rule 407 ,
and this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on this
issue.
The plaintiff also alleges that the trial court similarly
erred when it required plaintiff to show, as part of its prima
facie case, that the defendant had the ability to pay for the
cost of installing a fire sprinkler system in the defendant's
building.

The plaintiff's rationale for this argument is that if

the defendant felt that it was financially unable to provide a
fire sprinkler system in it's building, that such an argument was
a defense that the defendant bears the burden of presenting and
proving.

In addition, the plaintiff argues that because the

question of what financial resources are available to the
defendant is within his exclusive control, the defendant, rather
than the plaintiff, bears the burden of providing such evidence.
The defendant's financial position is not in the defendant's
exclusive control.

Such information can be obtained through the

use of the discovery process.

The plaintiff failed to request

this information from the defendant during fifteen months of the
discovery period in this case.
The plaintiff's arguments are fatally flawed.

As stated

earlier in this brief, in order to prove a prima facie case of
negligence against the defendant, the plaintiff must show, as an
element of her proof, the cost of installing the fire sprinkler
13

system in the defendant's building; the ability of the defendant
to pay those costs; and that a reasonable and prudent building
owner would have incurred these costs.

The defendant's building

met the building code when built, and passed all subsequent
inspections by the Fire Marshall.

No code, statute or regulation

required the defendant to install a fire sprinkling system.
Therefore, plaintiff must prove in her prima facie case that a
reasonable and prudent landlord in defendant's position would
have installed a fire sprinkling system.
example of the risk/benefit analysis.

This is a classic

The plaintiff did not have

this proof after all discovery had been completed and dispositive
motions were heard.
The only purported evidence of the defendant's ability to
pay for the cost of installing the fire sprinkler system was that
the defendant remodeled the building in 19 84 at the approximate
cost of $500,000.

This remodeling was, in fact, an enveloping of

the building to reduce heat loss in order to decrease heating
costs and repair the roof.

This evidence, by itself, is

insufficient as a matter of law, to show the defendant's ability
to pay for a fire sprinkler system in the six years prior to
February 7, 1990.

The plaintiff argued in briefs and at oral

argument that the majority of the defendant's tenants are elderly
people.

Burton Miller, the defendant's building manager,

testified that most were retired and on fixed incomes.
latter fact, Mr. Miller said, placed limitations on the

14

This

defendant's (a non-profit corporation) ability to raise rent and
to pay for improvements.
The plaintiff did not produce any admissible evidence on the
defendant's ability to pay for the cost of installing a fire
sprinkler system in the defendant's building.

therefore, the

plaintiff could not prove, at the time of the motion for summary
judgment, this portion of her prima facie case, and the trial
court's order granting summary judgment in defendant's favor
should be affirmed accordingly by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was correct.

The plaintiff has not established

a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.

In order

to prove a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant,
the plaintiff must show, as an element of her proof, the cost of
installing a fire sprinkler system and, separately, the ability
of the defendant to pay such costs.

Failure to prove either fact

prevents the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case.
plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to prove the
required elements of a prima facie case against the defendant.
Therefore, the defendant respectfully submits that the
defendant's motion for summary be affirmed by this Court as a
matter of law.
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